The issue at bar in Medeiros v. Client Services, Inc., 09 CV 6170 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 17, 2010) was whether a debt collectors efforts to collect the debt by contacting the debtor’s attorney violated the FDCPA. After the debtor received a dunning letter it sought legal assistance from a legal clinic. A clinic attorney faxed a letter to the debt collector stating that the debtor was represented by counsel and instructing it to cease all further collection activities and contact with the debtor. After receipt of this letter the debt collector contacted the clinic to demand the debtor settle his account. The debtor sued under the FDCPA contending that the debt collector violated §1692c(c) when it continued to demand payment of the debt. The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted the debt collector summary judgment. At issue was whether communication with a consumer’s attorney is actionable under the section. The debtor cited another decision from the district with nearly identical facts, _Startare v. Credit Bureau of N. Am., LLC,_ No. 09 C 6464, slip op. (N.D. Ill. June 3, 2010), which held that based on the Seventh Circuit’s ruling in _Evory v. RJM Acquisitions Funding, LLC,_ 505 F.3d 769 (7th Cir.2007) the defendant’s communication with the plaintiff’s attorney violated § 1692c(c). In _Evory_, the court held that communications with a consumer’s attorney are subject to § 1692d through § 1692f of the FDCPA, which prohibit harassing, deceptive, and unfair practices in debt collection. The _Startare_ court decided that the Seventh Circuit’s rationale in _Evory_ for applying the FDCPA to communications sent to a consumer’s attorney under these sections would be equally applicable to 15 U.S.C. § 1692c. The debt collector argued that the _Startare_ case was incorrectly decided and that the decision in _Tinsley v. Integrity Fin. Partners, Inc.,_ No. 09 C 7925, slip op. (N.D.Ill. Mar. 29, 2010), which is currently before the Seventh Circuit, is correct. In _Tinsley_, the district court ruled that § 1692c(c) did not apply to communication with a consumer’s attorney after the consumer refused to pay his outstanding debt. It determined that Congress did not intend for the term consumer in § 1692c(c) to be interchangeable with the consumer’s attorney and distinguished the _Evory_ holding as not based on § 1692c(c) nor the definition of consumer in § 1692c(d). The court in _Medeiros_ found the _Tinsley_ decision was more persuasive because the debtor’s attorney is omitted from the list of persons defined as consumers which indicates that § 1692c(c) is not intended to prohibit communication to a consumer’s attorney. Furthermore, the debtor waived his claim by asking his attorney to direct all future communications to the LASPD office. Thus, the debt collector ceased all communication with debtor after it received his written refusal to pay the debt, and it did not violate this section when it contacted his attorney as directed.
Author
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Solomon has nearly two decades of experience representing financial institutions, real estate investors and privately owned business entities. Solomon concentrates his practice in the areas of banking, consumer financial services, real estate, business law and related litigation and appellate practice.
